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If the grooming behavior found almost universally 
among primates functions at least in part to remove 
ectoparasites, we can confidently say that humans 
were engaging in pest control even before we became 
human. Once we domesticated plants and animals and 
were raising our own food, the matter of controlling 
pests assumed economic importance and became ame-
nable to a business model. The first pest control busi-
nessmen in the West were probably the rat-catchers of 
the Middle Ages, whose profession grew out of the rise 
of urban centers, lack of sanitation, and the outbreak 
of the plagues that led to the origin of the word “pest” 
itself (Oxford English Dictionary 1971). Rat-catch-
ing was imported from European to American urban 
centers around 1840, and by the 1920s was well 
enough established to have spawned state and national 
associations (Snetsinger 1983). By then, the control of 
the injurious insects provided even bigger markets than 
injurious rodents. Traditional pest control businesses 
retain an emphasis on the control of invertebrates to 
this day. Agriculturalists were battling pests early on as 
well, and federal assistance came to them during the 
1890s in the form of an Office of Economic Ornithol-
ogy and Mammalogy founded by C. Hart Merriam. 
The Smith-Lever Act of 1914 established university 
agricultural extension services to augment some of 
these services (San Julian 2012), and with the 1931 
passage of the Animal Damage Control Act, the gov-
ernment’s role in vertebrate pest control was further 
codified. Decades later, beginning around the 1970s, 
changing conditions in the cities and suburbs created 
an opportunity for the rise of small private businesses 
specializing in nuisance wildlife control (Braband and 
Clark 1987). These businesses were aimed at wildlife 
species such as squirrels and raccoons that had not pre-
viously been the focus of professional control services.
At about the same time the nuisance wildlife control 
industry was taking shape, environmental awareness 
was rising out of a growing body of knowledge point-
ing to the dangers associated with the chemical control 
of pests. This complemented and may have stimulated 
contemporaneous social activism focused on the treat-
ment of animals, leading to the rise of what can be 
called the modern “animal movement” (Nash 1989). 
Environmentalism, ecological thinking, animal rights, 
conservation biology, urban wildlife, and nuisance 
wildlife control all recently and in a sense suddenly 
have become relevant to the dialogue about pest 
control. That dialogue has often involved more 
polemic than discussion. My objective here will be to 
address where, and perhaps how, further discussion 
might take place.
THE “ANIMAL MOVEMENT”: WHAT IS IT 
ABOUT?
The animal movement that grew of the activism of the 
1970s, but which also has a significant history before 
that, comprises 3 main streams of thought and action: 
animal rights, animal welfare, and animal protection. 
Animal rights in its contemporary form largely took 
shape around the philosophies introduced by Peter 
Singer (1975) and Tom Regan (1983). Singer and 
Regan articulate quite different ideas about the du-
ties we owe animals, belying the popular assumption 
that this field stands as a monolithic block of thought; 
still, the term “animal rights” is what one hears most 
often used in reference to any form of activism over 
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the treatment of animals, especially in the press. Ani-
mal welfare typically describes a movement that first 
took form in the mid-nineteenth century, largely over 
concern for the treatment of domestic animals, 
particularly pets and draft animals, which led to the 
founding of local humane societies and animal control 
agencies (Niven 1967). A broad generalization about 
animal welfare would be that it is concerned more with 
how animals are treated than why. Animal protection, 
to this writer, is a field in which some of the concerns 
of both animal rights and welfare join with certain 
aspects of environmentalism, especially those dealing 
with the status and welfare of natural communities. 
When considering a program to reduce a population 
of prairie dogs, an animal protectionist would ask not 
only how the animals would be killed but also why the 
killing was justified in the first place.
Activism springs directly from all of the arms of the 
animal movement and ranges broadly across a spec-
trum of social activities encompassing everything from 
violence to civil disobedience to democratically legis-
lated initiatives. That animal activism and vertebrate 
pest control would provide a fertile ground for direct 
confrontation, and that activism would be perceived as 
an important threat to wildlife managers, is a bit of a 
foregone conclusion (e.g., Brooks 1988). Differences, 
some big and some small, always will exist between the 
two, making it less relevant that they be resolved than 
understood. How to arrive at a better understanding 
of the varied opinions and positions taken in the high-
ly plural environments surrounding wildlife damage 
management perhaps is the most significant challenge 
in contemporary wildlife damage management.
SOME GENERAL PREMISES
Given that any dialogue about the control of verte-
brate pests will likely include strongly held and often 
diametrically opposing points of view, it might be 
helpful to look for common ground and shared con-
cepts before considering ways to deal with disagree-
ments. Recent studies of human-wildlife conflict em-
phasize what those who specialize in this area have 
known more intuitively for some time—that it is often 
human-human more than human-wildlife conflicts 
that managers must face (Madden 2004). People 
construct their view of conflicts based on individual 
and group-shaped assumptions, perspectives, and val-
ues (Goedeke and Herda-Rapp 2005). What anyone 
feels is right or appropriate for a given issue can, and 
perhaps inevitably has to, be wrapped up in his or her 
identity. The facts (data) can be laid out on the table, 
but the table itself (feelings) is very much a part of the 
room.
It is also important that those involved in the dia-
logue about wildlife damage management, either 
as practitioner or critic, own a piece of the concept 
of “humaneness.” Both the term and the concept of 
humaneness have to come into much more com-
mon use and those who use or appeal to either have 
to be clear about what it is they are saying. For ex-
ample, consider the almost casual way in which many 
who advocate for humane treatment embrace the 
“humane” trap—the box or cage-like device that often 
is employed in wildlife control to capture and hold 
animals alive. It may be right to argue that cage traps 
are less likely to cause harm than other restraining 
devices, such as snares or foothold traps, but it is still 
important to recognize that they can. Abrasions and 
lacerations are something anyone who uses cage traps 
has encountered, particularly in excitable species or 
individuals, and broken teeth are not uncommon. A 
broken canine can lead to prolonged suffering or even 
a potentially life-threatening problem that will not 
be manifested until long after release. Human error, 
ignorance, or apathy also can lead to a painful death 
when trapped animals are left unattended in extreme 
heat or cold. Perhaps it would be better not to call any 
restraining devices “humane” and turn attention in-
stead to appropriate frameworks within which their 
use, or misuse, could be better defined.
DO WE NEED ETHICAL FRAMEWORKS?
The concept of ethical frameworks can be used to 
visualize how we ought to act toward wild animals 
(Fraser 1999, Hadidian et al. 2006). Ethical frame-
works are widely used as guides in everything from 
medical practices to tow truck operations. They are 
useful in directing the way we think, or should think, 
about issues, even when we know we cannot—or will 
not—act accordingly. Ethical frameworks are appli-
cable to all aspects of animal welfare and pest con-
trol (Littin and Mellor 2005, Warburton and Norton 
2007) including areas where we might think ethics 
not to be a consideration at all. For example, consider 
the relationships we have with insects and commen-
sal rodents, two common types of pests. A reason-
able argument could be made that we owe no duty or 
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obligations to either. Both invade our homes, expose 
us to disease, spoil our food, and compete for our 
crops, among other insults and injuries. Why should 
we worry about how we treat either?
Arguably, we have obligations toward both, even 
if they are minimal. If we concede that insects and 
rodents are sentient, that is, capable of experiencing 
feelings such as pain, then we at least should hold a 
duty toward them not to cause harm when they are 
not, or only trivially are, causing us harm or harm-
ing things we value (Lockwood 1987). With insects, 
such thinking opens a moral umbrella over the many 
tens of thousands of species whose presence does no 
offense to humans, may yet be found critical to the 
functioning of healthy ecosystems, and for whom ex-
tinction would be irrecoverable. With rodents, given 
our long and adverse relationship, the idea of minimal 
harm perhaps is more applicable to how we kill them 
than why we need to kill. If, as has been convincingly 
shown, we can identify ways to kill rodents that are 
far less humane than others (Mason and Littin 2003), 
then we can argue that the least inhumane of these 
ought to be given priority consideration when control 
is going to occur, as a duty and obligation to avoid 
causing unnecessary suffering. 
MEASURING HUMANENESS
Humans intervene in the lives of wild animals for many 
reasons to create both positive and negative welfare 
consequences (Kirkwood and Sainsbury 1996). These 
interventions may be indirect, as in the case of human-
caused habitat loss, or direct, as in the case of trapping 
and killing animals deemed to be pests. Whatever the 
case, interventions can be conceptualized using ethical 
frameworks to identify practical procedures that will 
ground interventions in more concrete and measur-
able understanding of the extent to which animals will 
suffer, as well as die unnecessarily.
Criteria for the measurement of suffering are fairly well 
established. Kirkwood et al. (1994), for example, iden-
tified several factors associated with welfare measures, 
including: the number of animals affected, the cause 
and nature of the harm, the duration of the harm, 
and the capacity of the animal to suffer. Proulx (1999) 
applies welfare standards to the technology used to 
lethally trap or restrain wild animals and introduces a 
set of factors that includes: time to death, efficiency, 
statistical confidence, uncontrolled environmental set-
tings, and state-of-art traps. Metrics such as these can 
be used to create assessments of welfare states.
Sharp and Saunders (2011) provided a robust mod-
el of welfare assessment. Recognizing that both 
nonlethal and lethal methods can affect welfare, they 
employed the concept of domains as recognized by the 
United Kingdom Farm Animal Welfare Council to 
identify five areas in which an animal’s welfare can be 
compromised: water and food deprivation; environ-
mental challenge; pain, injury, and disease; behavioral 
restriction; and anxiety, fear, and distress. Then they 
created an assessment matrix that scales the severity 
of the harm as a function of its duration, to identify 
the overall consequence of an intervention. Addition-
ally, for killing methods, the level of suffering before 
insensibility occurs can be mapped against the dura-
tion of the event to measure welfare consequences. 
The resulting matrices can be used to organize think-
ing about severity in situations that compromise an 
animal’s welfare.
In theory at least, such approaches can provide 
objective comparisons of the welfare consequences 
of different techniques commonly used in wildlife 
damage management. Obviously, a raccoon caught 
in a cage trap and removed an hour after capture 
suffers significantly less than one caught and held for 
an entire day, and the assessment matrix easily accounts 
for this. But did a raccoon caught in a body-gripping 
trap that rendered her insensible in six minutes and 
dead in fifteen suffer less than a raccoon left in a cage 
trap for too many hours, who then died of hypother-
mia? Ideally, welfare matrix assessments will be able 
to address such questions and go a long way toward 
creating more focused and productive dialogues, if not 
consensus, about the welfare consequences of manage-
ment actions. One thing such assessments will not do, 
however, is fully address such questions as whether 
management is justified and objectives achievable in 
the first place.
MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES
Addressing these and other concerns about why pro-
grams are implemented has been a longstanding con-
cern of wildlife managers (e.g., McCabe and Kocizky 
1972), but a general set of management principles 
has only recently been derived (e.g. Fisher and Marks 
10
Proceedings of the 14th WDM Conference (2012)                                                                S. N. Frey, editor
Plenary Session
1996, Marks 1999, Littin et al. 2004). The following 
can initially be identified as required steps in manage-
ment of human-wildlife conflicts:
•	Need to act must be clear (justification),
•	Benefits sought must be realistic (achievability),
•	Methods to be employed must be able to achieve 
benefits (effectiveness),
•	Approach must be targeted to the problem-causing 
individuals (specificity),
•	Methods used must be the most humane available 
(welfare priority),
•	Consequences of actions must be amenable to eval-
uation (monitoring), and
•	Benefits achieved must be maintained (follow-up).
The process is open-ended and recursive. Once the 
follow-up is completed and results evaluated the cycle 
can be initiated again, if needed. Hadidian (2010) rec-
ommends these principles be made part of operating 
procedures in a grounded, stepwise decision-making 
and action process consistent with existing integrated 
pest management approaches and rationale.
HUMANENESS AND WILDLIFE CONTROL
The field of wildlife damage management is rapidly 
responding to new challenges such as the control of 
non-native species, new methodologies such as DNA 
analysis, and new disciplines such as human dimen-
sions research that substantively broaden, strength-
en, and expand the scope of this traditionally very 
conservative field. In a discipline where emphasis his-
torically has been placed on finding technical solutions 
to technical problems, wildlife damage managers now 
must focus on problems for which technical solutions 
might not even exist. Conflicts that arise over natural 
resources, such as wildlife, are increasingly recognized 
not so much as problems of management as they are 
of governance (Jentoft & Chuenpagdee 2009). How 
this will affect the field in the future remains to be 
seen, but it strongly suggests that new arrangements 
will be coming, broader dialogues opened, and more 
transparent programs initiated. A new form of pro-
fessionalism may emerge from the confluence of the 
private, corporate, and federal streams that currently 
stand more or less apart. A small step that might be 
taken in the direction of modernizing the professional 
practice of wildlife damage management would be to 
excise the word “pest” from its lexicon. Unless we can 
apply the term consistently to all species—the deer, 
beaver, geese, elephants, gorillas, and, yes, humans—
with whom conflicts arise that must be resolved, 
then it might be advisable to find alternative ways of 
describing matters. If we are to retain the term, then 
we ought to freely admit that any species can be 
referred to as a “pest,” and remember to include our-
selves, since it may well be that humans are the great-
est pest species of them all.
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